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SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES.
There are two ultimate kinds of jural relations. The first
of these relations is the Claim-Duty relation; where the domi-
nus of the relation can require an act to be performed by the
servus of the relation and where, accordingly, the servus of the
relation is under a duty to perform that act. - The second of
these ultimate relations is the Power-Liability relation; where
the dominus of the relation can perform an act which has the
effect directly or indirectly of cutting down the freedom of the
servus of the relation or of otherwise changing his legal posi-
tion?.
There is a striking difference between these two fundamen-
tal relations in this, that the Claim-Duty relation is or may be
a fiangible relation; while the Power-Liability relation is an
infrangible relation. Although the servus of a claim is ligated
(bound) to his duty, yet in many cases he may break the bond
of his duty.2 His duty requires him to act in one way, but in
'Duty always implies a restriction of natural freedom. Liability may
involve (a) restriction of natural freedom (e. g., landlord's power of re-
entry) ; (b) restriction of an artificial freedom enlarging the limits of natural
freedom (e. g., destruction of a claim or revocation of a power).; (c) arti-
ficial legal enlargement of natural liberty (e. g., offer of contract or convey-
ance).
"For example, a duty to pay a debt, created by a sealed instrument at
common law, cannot be broken. The action of debt in legal theory is for
specific enforcement. Cf. Terry, "Leading Principles of Anglo-American
Law," Sec. 147, P. 126.
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many cases he has the power to act in.a contrary way. On the-
other hand, a Power-Liability relation cannot be broken. It
can be exercised and in that way come to air end. It may-also
come to an end through the exercise of a conflicting power; it
may terminate b ' the exercise of a congruent'power; or it may
terminate by non-user.
lhstrations. If a note cofitains a power fo confess
judgment, the exercise of this power is the end of the power.
The power of an agent to ligate his principal may be termi-
nated by revocation. Where there is a choice of incon-
sistent remedies, as where the claimant may sue in trover
or in assumpsit, the exercise of one power terminates the
other. Where aiT offer is made, the power of acceptance
must be exercised within a reasonable time.
In none of these cases is the power broken. It is exerdsed
or not exercised or ceases to exist. The reason for this peculiar
difference between a claim and a power lies in the fact,, tlat a
claim relatiQn is an active relation from the standpoint of the
scrvus of the claim relation, while a power relation is an active
relation from the standpoint of the domintus of the power rela-
tion. The bearer of a duty can act adversely to the dominusj
but the holder of a power cannot in a legal sense act adversely
to himself. Where -the dominus of a power refrains from exer-
cising his power, he acts neither against the- servus of the rela-
tion nor against himself. Itis clear that by not acting he-does
not affect the servus. He does not affect himself in a legal
sense because a man cannot sustain a legal relation to himself.
Duty Powers. Where there is a duty to do an act, there
must be a power to do it. There may- be a duty to do -an act
which the servus. economically or physically is unable to per-
form. A debtor may not have the money to pay, but yet he
owes the duty, and in legal contemplation he has the power to
pay and also the congruent power not to pay. The power not to
pay, when exercised, is directed against and affects the. creditor.
It is relational. Where the dominus of a non-Duty Power re-
frains from acting there is no relational fact. The refraining
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is not a power, at least not in a legal sense, but a liberty. If,
therefore, the dominus of a non-Duty Power does not exercise
his power, he exercises his liberty to refrain, but since liberty
means a capability of choice, the dominus of the power also
has the liberty to exercise his power. Liberty in the latter case
coincides with power, but since anomic relations are of no
concern in the law, the capability is expressed by power and not
by liberty. It may be pointed out in passing that a Duty-Power
does not involve, a liberty. Where there is duty there cannot
be liberty. Likewise, the power to violate a duty is not a lib-
erty.
I
A sanction as applied to a legal rule is "any conditional-
evil annexed to a law, to produce obedience and conformity to
it." It "is a second inter'ention . . . inflicting a specific evil
upon a specific person in consequence of a specific act or omis-
sion." 4  Since legal relations are based on legal rules, the term
"sanction" may also be applied to legal relations.5
A liability is a passive ligation which can only be suffered
or not suffered. A liability cannot, therefore, have a sanction
as that term has been defined. In strict type (zeugmanomic)
legal relations, a liability is either an evil or it leads to one. In
quasi jural (mesonomic) relations a liability is often an eco-
nomic good (e. g., the liability of having an offer made). 6
Ilhslrationz. Where a trespasser is liable to be
ejected, the liability itself is an evil. Since, however, a
trespasser is still only liable to be ejected, the evil is a con-
ceptual evil. The exercise of the power to eject a trespasser
is a factual evil. Where there is a power to rescind, the
power is a conceptual evil, but the exercise of it is a fac-
tual evil.
"Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed.), 523.
'Terry, note 2, supra, 13.
'In Roman law a sanction was the clause of a penal law which provided
a punishment. Leguum eas partes quibus poenas constituimus adversus eos
qui contra leges fecerint sanctiones vocamus: D. 48, 19, 41; C. 12, 50, 20. For
other meanings of the term, see Austin, Jurisprudence (4th ed.), 524.
'In no case can a reward or benefit be a sanction: Austin, note 3, supra, 93.
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Under the definition, a sanction exists only where two ele-
ments are found: (a) where there is a breach of duty; and (b)
where an evil follows. A breach of duty is always followed by
an evil, but an evil may be inflicted on a person which is not a
sanction. The breach of a duty is an evil inflicted on the domi-
nus of the claim; this evil is not a sanction. Sanction and evil,
therefore, are not synonymous.
The evolution of every legal relation has legal consequences,
but the term "sanction" is limited to that consequence which re-
sults when a legal relation is destroyed by internal devolution.
This consequence always takes the form of a new legal relation.
Illustration. If A is owner of a chattel, there are
unlimited numbers of similar claims against other persons
not to interfere with the chattel. These claims correspond
to negative duties. Both the claim and the duty in these
cases are unpolarized; the connection between the dominus
of the claim and the legally unidentified servi is shadowy.
It is only by legal hypothesis that unpolarized relations can
be denominated legal relations at all. Since a. breach of
such an unpolarized duty can occur in a moment of time,
it is accordingly necessary to assume that these duties in
like manner are performed in discrete moments of time.
Unpolarized relations, therefore, are that kind in which the
servus is legally unidentified by the investitive facts, and
which, if negative, call for a numberless series of perform-
ances. The same also is true of any polarized negative duty
as where a seller of a business agrees not to compete with
the buyer for a term of years. These performances,
-whether considered as one continuous performance or as
numberless performances in a continuous series, are the
evolution of the relation. If B, in the example given, con-
verts the chattel, the wrongful act is contrary in motion and
opposite in sign." This contrary act results in internal
devolution (destruction) of the original relation and the
consequence of this devolution is the creation of a new po-
larized claim and a duty to pay damages for the trespass.
'For an explanation of the terms "evolution" and "devolution" as applied
to legal relations, see: "Nomic and Anomic Relations" in 7 Cornell L. Q. tx
0g. n. 23) (192).
'The duty was to refrain from a negative act moving toward the dominus
of the relation. The wrongful act is a positive act moving against the servus
(the former dominus) but from an opposite direction.
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Since there are only two ultimate legal relations and since
duties alone have sanctions, it follows that these sanctions are
expressible only in one or both of these ultimate relations. The
sanction of a duty, therefore, is either a fiew duty or a liability
or both.
Illustration. If a debtor fails to pay his creditor
when the money is due, a new duty immediately arises to
pay damages for the breach of duty.' This new duty is a
sanction and it is called a sanctional duty.10 The new duty
to pay damages is accompanied by a liability of suit. This
liability is a sanctional liability. A sanctional duty is in-
frangible-it cannot be broken; it is not sanctionable. It
'may be specifically enforced by means of the accompanying
sanctional liability, but if it is not enforced in apttime, it
perishes or is reduced to a lower juristic level.
"See, however, Prof. NV. W. Cook, "Powers of Courts of Equity," iS
COLUMBIA L. REV. 37 (45) (1915); Prof. Cook says: It is "difficult to main-
tain . . . that there is any 'right to damages. . .. If there were,
however, it would be violated by non-payment and a new remedial right would
arise to be again violated by non-payment, and so on ad infinitun." The fact
that where the damages are unliquidated a tender does not in any case affect
costs proves nothing, since it is clear that where the damages are liquidated
a tender does affect costs. Cf. Terry, note 2, supra, 13o. These discussions
are very suggestive in call;ng attention to the peculiar nature of a sanctional
right. It seems to us, however, that the true explanation of Lhe matter is
that a sanctional right is an infrangible relation. It can not be destroyed by
new breach nor can it be destroyed by a tender in any case, although, where
a simple contract sanctional right is liquidated, there is a duty in the dominus
of the right to accept the tender. The sanction of this duty is shown by its
effect on the costs. There is not, if this explanation is sound, any possibility
of an infinite series of breaches of an infinite series of sanctional rights. The
very difficulty of such an assumption is enough to warrant its rejection with-
out, however, accepting the alternative of a power relation (the permissive
theory) as a substitute for a sanctional claim. The permissive theory stated
by Dr. Terry (note 2, supra, 122) and accepted by Prof. Cook has difficulties
of its own in getting over the nature of the action of assumpsit. Both diffi-
culties are avoided by regarding the sanctional right as infrangible.
20 The combinations "primary" and "sanctioning" rights, or "primary" and
"secondary" rights, or "antecedent" and "remedial" rights, are not altogether
satisfactory. Of these terms, the term "sanctioning" appears to be the only
one worth preserving. Since legal relations normally occur in a connected
series with various accompanying collateral relations also connected in a
series, the terms "primary" or "antecedent" and "secondary" are too indefi-
nite for precise use, standing alone. That criticism does hot apply, however,
to the term "sanctional" right or duty, which in itself indicates what specific
legal relation is under discussion. The right from whch a sanction flows
may be called a sanctioned right. A right which may be followed by a sanc-
tion (i. e., frangible right) is a sanctionable right.
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Since duties alone have sanctions, there are four ways in
-which a sanction may arise: (i) by breach of a positive duty;
(2) by breach of a duty for the protection of a positive duty;
(3) by breach of a negative duty; (4) by breach of a duty for
the protection of a negative duty.
Ordinarily, protective duties do not exist, but the increas-
ing development of the prophylactic function of law will, in an-
other generation or two, create a large body of legal rules deal-
ing with protective duties and the growth of the practical im-
portance of these protective duties will require a corresponding
theoretical development.
If there is a duty not to commit a tort, ordinarily the civil
law will not interfere in the face of preparations to do the un-
lawful act. In exceptional cases, however, the law will not wait
until the wrong actually has been accomplished, but will relieve
against preparation of the unlawful act by a civil remedy (e. g.,
prohibitory injunction) which has for its purpose the laying of
a new duty fortified by additional conditional sanctions on the
wrongdoer. Likewise, if there is a contract duty, ordinarily
the law will not interfere in the face of preparations looking to
breach, but, in exceptional cases, the law will not wait until the
breach actually has been accomplished and will relieve against
preparation of the unlawful act by a civil remedy (e. g., decree
of specific performance) antecedent to breach of the principal
duty.1
In these instances, there is a protected and a protecting re-
lation. They are, therefore, phylactic relations. The relation
protected may be called the endophylactic relation and the pro-
tecting relation may be called the ectophylactic relation. 2 The
endophylactic relation may be likened to the body of an insect,
and the ectophylactic relation to its antennam (feelers) and
claws.
Dyne v. Vreeland, ii N. J. Eq. 370, 13 N. J. Eq. 143 (1857) ; Davison v.
Davison, 13 N. J. Eq. 246 (1861); cited by Geo. L. Clark, Equity, iio (i92o);
cf. Staley v. Murphy, 47 Ill. 242 (I868).
" For a further discussion of legal phylaxis. see "Classification ofJural
Interrelations," i BosT. U-sv. L REv. 28s (218-19) (192u).
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illustrations. If a debt is owing, and the debtor
before maturity of the debt conceals property or is about
to take property out of the state, there may be, in some
jurisdictions, an attachment of the debtor's goods for the
protection of the principal relation. In such case, there is
a protecting duty not to jeopardize the principal relation,
and it is for the breach of the protecting duty that a new
liability is inflicted by way of sanction. The same remarks
apply to a'writ of ne exeat. Many other well-known illus-
trations are found in the field of equitable remedies; for
example, bills quia tinet and bills of peace. It is especially
in the field of equity that ectophylactic rights prevail. A
familiar illustration in the law field is anticipatory breach
of contract. There is a protecting duty not to do acts which
make ultimate performance impossible. The breach of that
duty is the imposition of a duty to render compensation
as for a breach of the principal relation. In this case, there
is not an accelerated breach of the principal duty, but a
present breach of the protecting relation. Logically., -a judg-
ment for damages should be taken only as security await-
ing the day of performance of the principal duty, but the
law prefers the simpler though fictional operation of accel-
erated breach of the principal duty.
A wide field of ectophylactic rights has been opened up by
the so-called declaratory judgment procedure, the principle of
which is already familiar in various legal and equitable rem-
edies.13 The juristic novelty of that procedure lies precisely in
the creation of new duties of a protective nature to supplement
other principal duties. There is a duty not to begin (or to main-
tain) an unmeritorious action. The sanction of this duty is
nullity of the procedural act. 14  It would be incomprehensible
that a privilege of free access to the courts should be restrained
unless that restraint were directed against an abuse of privilege.
The plaintiff is restrained from proceeding because he is doing
or attempting what should not be done. The point is sometimes
misunderstood or overlooked that the state never prohibits an
act or commands one, where a contrary act is in motion, unless
See Borchard, "The Declaratory Judgment," 28 YALE L J. i, xoS (i9x8).1 Terry, note 2, supra, 123; Austin, note 3, 'upra, 5=
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the contrary act is a wrong. The command to a defendant to
desist from. a nuisance does not -in the slightest way differ from
the command to a plaintiff, whatever the procedural form, to
desist from an unfounded law-suit. juristically, a prohibitory
injunction against a trespass or a nuisance is of the same- na-
ture as a command, in the form of a non-suit or a nil capiat,
from prosecuting an unfounded claim.
The declaratory judgment procedure is only one step in
advance of the ordinary judgment for the defendant. There is
a duty by virtue of that procedure in every party to a legal trans-
action not to make an unfounded claim as to the legal effect of
that transaction.13 That duty is broken by one of the parties
when a controversy arises on the legal effect of. a transaction.
The sanction of the duty is a repetitive official formulation of"
the old duty. There may be a further sanction in a duty to
pay costs.
It is interesting to observe the complicated series of
steps which follow a breach of a legally frangible relation
to the last stage of economic repose. The reactions of na-
ture are immediate and concrete. In the legal field, except
in the sphere of self-help, reactions are either not immediate
or not concrete. 1f, for example, there is a breach of duty
to perform a promise, the first reaction often is, a new
legal relation involving a duty to repair the consequences
of the first breach. This new relation is infrangible and,
if not evolved by performance, may be specifically enforced
by an action. When the power to sue is exercised and car-
ried to judgment, an officially formulated repetitive duty
is substituted for the second duty. Upon failure to per-
form this latter duty in the form of a judgment, economic
satisfaction, if possible, can be attained only by the appli-
cation of a new sanction, the power of execution by a levy
or attachment, leading in the normal case to a sale of prop-
erty and a new duty in the executive officer to pay over the
proceeds. As to the debtor, the breach of the primary duty
is followed by a series of sanctions in the form of .new
duties and liabilities.
,' For the scope of the declaratory- judgment in modern law in the various
countries, see Borchard, note 13, supra.
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Three points may here be noticed. The sanctional duty
to pay compensation for the breach of a duty was said to be
infrangible. In that respect it is like a sealed debt at common
law which is not susceptible of breach, or like a valid promise
to convey land which may be specifically enforced. In these
cases, however, there is an accompanying duty of a phylactio
nature-the duty to perform aptly. The latter duty is frangible
and it is for the breach of that duty that a sanction is imposed.
If a duty is infrangible, it cannot have a sanction, and since
there is a sanction in these cases it can only be connected with
some other form of duty which accompanies and protects the
principal relation.
The next point to be noticed is that -a sanction, in the
sense of a state-imposed or state-authorized evil to a wrongdoer,
may be in a form which only repeats the old duty. But to be
effective as sanction it is not enough that it be merely repetitive-
The nature of the sanction lies in the strengthening of the legal
bond between the parties-all to the end that the basal relation
between the parties may be normally evolved. This strengthen-
ing of the legal bond may be made effective by repetitional for-
mulation of the duty in an official way, as in the case of a dee-
latory judgment, or it may be a substitutional form of duty
accompanied by an added power relation, as in the case Of a
breach of duty followed by a new duty to render compensation
for the breach, accompanied by a power of action.
The third point to be noticed is that when speaking of
phylactic relations we are concerned only with those which are
homomorphic-where there is a principal duty ,6 which is ac-
companied by a protecting duty, and not cases where there is
a duty accompanied by a power. For example, the claim to
corporal integrity is accompanied by the duty not to attempt to
commit a battery. These are phylactic relations and they are
homomorphic. The breach of the latter duty creates a sanc-
" To avoid the possibility of confusion, it may be stated at this point that
endophylactic and ectophylactic relations are varieties of principal and acces-
sory relations which in their turn are divisions of dependent relations. See
"Classification of Jural Interrelations," i Bosr. UNiv. L. -REV. 208 (218-19)
(9zx).
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tional power of self-defense, and a new sanctional duty to pay
compensation for the assault with an accompanying power of
action. A breach of the principal relation creates a new sanc-
tional duty to pay compensation and an accompanying power of
action. We are concerned here with any form of sanction, but
!he point to be noticed is that a protecting duty is not a sanction.
Summing up, sanctions consist of new duties and of powers
(or the exercise of powers). Sanctions are private -when they
are executed by private force; they are public when executed by
state force. Sanctions are automatic wheut they are imposed
directly upon a breach of duty; they are executive when they
result from an act of choice. Sanctions are specific when they
involve particular duties or powers; they are general when they
involve duties to pay or powers to proceed generally to realize
a sum of money. Finally, sanctions are intermediate and ulti-
mate.1
7
Illustrations. If a landowner ejects a trespasser,
this is the exercise of a specific sanctional power; it is a
private, executive, ultimate sanction. Where a sheriff sells
goods at execution sale, this is a general sanctional power;
it is a public, executive, ultimate sanction. Where a debtor
makes default, the new duty to pay damages is a sanctional
duty; it is an automatic, general, intermediate sanction.
Where judgment is entered on the debt, the judgment is a
new sanctional duty; it is a general, executive, intermediate
sanction.
II
The activities of courts, as courts, are reducible to the cre-
ation of duties and the creation of powers. Courts never act
in an adjudicative capacity except where a. legal relation has
been violated. More specifically, a court zever acts as a court
unless a duty has been infringed.
Courts, like other organs of government must and do exer-
cise other functions than those that give them their chief char-
"For a somewhat different classification of sanctions, see Terry, note ,
supra, i6.
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acter and name. Courts in all countries have legislated (i. e.,
made legal rules) and continue to do so. The common law is
almost entirely a product of the courts, and a large part of legis-
lation has been converted into a judicial gloss. But the process
of making new legal rules or of changing old rules is- for the
most part subsidiary to the settlement of controversies. The lead-
ing exception is where courts make rules of procedure.
There is a large class of cases where it is supposed the state
administers justice without the use of physical force. A typical
instance is where a bill is filed by trustees asking for construction
of a will or where an executor or a receiver -petitions for leave
to compromise a claim or to do some other act in the course of
administration. Such situations compel us either to amend the
statement that courts never act as courts except on the violation
si. duty, or in the alternative, to discover in them a violation of
duty. If a will is construed by a court, the decree of the court
amounts to a command; that is to say, a duty is imposed on the
trustees to act in accordance with the decree. There does not seem
to be any difficulty for this illustration in assuming that the decree
is a sanctional duty based on a breach of a protecting duty not to
controvert the legal relations created by the will.
If leave is granted to a receiver or to an executor to do an
act in the course of administration, there is not in form at least
any command to do the act or not to do it. If the receiver does
the act, he is not responsible if the court had jurisdiction to
authorize it. In substance, however, the legal effect of the order
is either (i) to command the receiver to act or else (2) to im-
pose a duty on creditors and others not to bring in question the
act if and whe n done. The difficulty here is not in finding the
actual or potential force of the state, but in discovering an ante-
cedent breach of an endophylactic or ectophylactic relation. There
are two juristic alternatives:
(i) It may be claimed that in these cases courts do not func-
tion as courts but ai administrative agencies, or as legislitive
agencies enacting special legislation creating legal relations in
specific pe'sons, as where a legislative body grants a divorce or
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enacts a law legitimizing a particular person; or (2) it may be
assumed that there has been breach of an ectophylactic (protect-
ing) relation.
The second view may be maintained with some plausibility
but the first is probably the easier to support and seems to us the
correct one. Writs of error, of supersedeas, of certiorari, and
of procedendo; decrees to perpetuate testimony, for testimony de
bene cssc, and of adoption; and orders governing the administra-
tion of executors, administrators, receivers, guardians, conserva-
tors, and trustees in bankruptcy-whether procedurally conten-
tious in form or not-are administrative in substance.18 They are
not sanctional dispositions and courts when acting in such in-
stances do not exercise judicial functions in the strict sense. The
same observation applies also to the concluding steps in such ad-
ministrative proceedings-to settlements of accounts, discharges
of receivers, executors, etc., and also to discharges in bank-
ruptcy.' But this observation does not apply, for example, to
decrees of foreclosure, of divorce, jactitation of marriage, or for
the dissolution of partnership. These are abrogative declarations
of a sanctional character based on precedent violations of duty.
They are strictly judicial in character according to the proposed
test.
Excluding, therefore, all administrative functions of courts
as in the proper sense non-judicial, and having in mind that legal
relations may be accompanied by protecting relations, the activi-
ties of courts may be invoked in the following cases: (I) before
infringement of the principal relation; and (2) after infringe-
ment of the principal relation.
From the standpoint of a harmonious and effective social
life, the remedy involving the least amount of social friction is
"It would perhaps be readily admitted by those who do not accept the
test of judicial action proposed in this article, that the appointment of a re-
ceiver, etc., is a pure act of administration.
"To these examples may be added the numerous instances ouf prudential
justice (freiwillige Gerichtsbarkeit), among the rest, declarations of death,
of legitimacy, and of majority, authentication and registration of documents,
issuance of patents, trade-marks, etc. See Gareis, "Science of Law," 256 sq.,
26o sq.; Dorner, "Verfahren der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit," in Kohler-
tHoltzendorff (1913) Enzyklopfidie 111, 407 sq.
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to be preferred where a remedy is necessary. The existence of
law and the social instinct normally are in themselves a sufficient
safeguard of social harmony, but when legal relations become
discordant, a remedy is necessary and the one which is the least
dcstructive to the social tissues is the one which simply restates
a duty in an official and authoritative fonn without any further
present intervention. This is the declaratory remedy.
i. The declaratory remedy may be invoked in two classes
of cases: (i) Before breach of a principal relation; and (2) after
breach of a principal relation.
The declaratory remedy when invoked before breach of an
endophylactic relation has two forms: (i) repetitivc-restating
in authoritative form the existence of a duty or power which has
become the subject of controversy; and (2) e.rchding-negating
in authoritative form the existence of an asserted legal relation
(duty or power).
20 "
The declaratory remedy when invoked after the breach of
an endophylactic relation has two forms: (i) constitutive and
(2) abrogative.
Illustrations. Where a duty or power exists and the
servus of the relation denies the existence of such duty or
power, the denial of the existence of the duty or power is
a breach of an ectophylactic relation. The endophylactic re-,
"0 The term "declaratory" is used here in the wide, and, as it seems to us,
proper, sense to include any judgment of the existence or non-existence of a
legal relation or any judgment creating or dissolving a legal relation in what-
ever form, so long as that judgment is merely declaratory and does not for-
mally include a present constraint. The effort to confine the term to one
species of judicial declaration (the so-called declaratory judgment as com-
monly understood), if it prevails, will make it necessary to invent another
term for the remaining declaratory remedies or else create the risl: that the
legal nature of this important group of remedies will be misunderstood. it
may be suggested that the generic term should be permitted to stand for its
generic purpose and that for the narrower function of declarations which pre-
cede the breach of principal (endophylactic) relations, the term prophylactic
(or preventive) declaration be employed.
At this point, it may also be stated that the terms. "repetitive" and "ex-
cluding" are generic terms as here used and are not intended to be substitutes
for the terms "affirmative" and "negative" as applied to judicial declarations
of legal relations. It is entirely proper to speak of affirmative or negative
preventive declarations, but these terms cannot be used in the wider sense,
since there would be instant conflict with constitutive and abrogative declara-
tions.
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lation, however, remains unimpaired, and the couirt in the
so-called declaratory judgment procedure enters a finding
which repeats the duty or power. The legal relation which
was uncertain and disputed is now judicially established.
Where, on the other hand, a duty or power is asserted which
in fact does not exist, the court will enter an exciusory find-
ing which officially establishes the non-existence of the as-
serted legal relation. In the latter case the endophylactic
relation is the duty not to sue on the asserted duty or the
duty not to attempt to exercise the asserted power. There
are, accordingly, two ectophylactic relations: (i) the duty
not to make non-procedural assertion of the existence of
the duty or power, and (2) the duty not to make declaratory
procedural assertion of the duty or power.
An illustration of another type is interpleader in equity.
In this case there is an admission of a duty but an expression
of doubt as to which of two or more persons that duty is
owing. As to the defendant to whom the complainant owes
the duty, the decree is a repetitive declaration. As tothe
other defendants, it is an exclusory declaration. If the de-
cree is based on a duty owing at the time of the bill, it is a
repetitive declaration of a sanctional duty and the decree
accordingly will take on a constitutive element by merging
the sanctional duty into a judgment duty.
A decree reforming an instrument is based on the duty
of voluntary reformation. It is, therefore, -a breach of an
endophylactic relation. The decree, accordingly, is a con-
stitutive declaration. A decree declaring a trust is, likewise,
a constitutive declaration.
Examples of abrogative declarations based on breaches
of endophylactic relations are decrees of divorce and of dis-
solution of partnership. A decree removing a cloud is not,
however, an abrogative declaration, but an excluding dec-
laration based on breach of an ectophylactic relation. The
ectophylactic duty is to release an apparent claim affecting
title, accessory to the protection of ownership.
2. Next, in the order of preference from the standpoint of
social welfare, to a simple declaration of the existence or non-
existence of a legal relation, is the coercive declaration of a legal
duty. Compulsory declaration has two forms: (i) phylactic re-
straint; (2) phylactic compulsion.
SANCTIONS AND REMEDZES
The obvious illustration of phylactic restraint is a pro-
hibitory injunction. The basis of this restraint is the breach
of an ectophylactic duty in the form of a threat to infringe
the principal or endophylactic duty.
The clear illustration of phylactic compulsion is the
decree of specific performance.21 In this case also there has
been a breach of an ectophylactic relation, i. e., the duty to
perform aptly. In theory, the endophylactic duty is in-
frangible and it is always susceptible of enforcement, not-
withstanding the refusal of the promisor to perform.
A much purer example of phylactic compulsion is the
case of a threat to infringe an obligation cognizable in a
court of equity. In this case, there is a breach of an entirely
different ectophylactic relation. A court of equity in. a
proper case may fortify the duty of performance by an
anticipatory decree commanding performance on the due
date. The decree of ne c.reat is a further example of the
same kind. In that case, however, the ectophylactic duty is
specifically enforced for the protection of the endophylactic
duty. Mandamus is a further case of phylactic compulsion.
3. The above types exhaust all the cases of remedies which
are declaratory (in the broad sense). The next procedural stage
is where declaration in repetitive form is no longer availing be-
cause the discordance has gone beyond the applicability of a dec-
laratory remedy. The next remedy, accordingly, in order of
preference, is to restore the dominus of the relation to his former
legal position. This possibility, when it exists, implies that the
endophylactic relation has been infringed but that the corpus of
that infringed relation may be restored without, however, nullify-
ing the legal effect of the wrongdoing as against the wrongdoer.
" The term "specific performance" has been appropriated in professional
speech for this one variety of coercion. There are, however, juristically many
varieties of specific performance. Phylactic restraint is specific enforcement
of a required negative duty. In the field of compensatory remedies there are
numerous examples of specific performance. The action of debt is one of
specific performance: Cf. Terry, note 2, supra, 126 (i28) ; The Uniform Sales
Act establishes specific enforcement of simple contract debts: sec. 63.
Every frangible relation, as has been shown, evolves into an infrangible rela-
tion which is specifically enforced. Mandamus and other restorative remedies
are in substance specific enforcement. Since, however, use of the term"specific enforcement" in a wide sense would be confusing, we have chose,
as a generic term, "integral redress."
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This form of remedy, which may be termed restitution, is
illustrated in various ways by habeas corpus, replevin, forcible
detainer, ejectment, and, conditionally, by detinue.
4. The next stage beyond phylactic declaration in its various
forms and beyond restitution is to provide the dominus of the
relation with an equivalent for the harm which he has suffered
measured in money. This is the compensatory remedy of dam-
ages. Compensatory remedy has six forms based on (a) the
pecuniary loss or gain of the plaintiff and (b) the pecuniary
gain or loss of the defendant. This remedy, therefore, may pre-
sent the following variations: (i) where the plaintiff's loss and
the defendant's gain are equivalent; (2) where the damages are
measured by the plaintiffis loss and where the defendant has
received no pecuniary gain; (3) where the plaintiff has sustained
no economic loss and the defendant has received an economic
gain; (4) where neither plaintiff nor defendant has sustained or
received pecuniary loss or gain; (5) .where the plaintiff has re-
ceived pecuniary gain and the defendant has suffered pecuniary
loss; (6) where both plaintiff and defendant have received pe-
cuniary gain.
We assume in each of these cases an infringement of duty.
That being so, the plaintiff is entitled at least, in any one of
these cases, to nominal damages. The bearing of these permu-
tations lies in this, that they are instances where the question
whether a duty has been infringed depends on the further ques-
tion whether a pecuniary loss has been sustained. They may also
have an importance for the determination of the question of what
is remedial responsibility as distinguished from penal responsibil-
ity. The distinction between remedial and penal responsibility
often is of importance in the construction of statutes and in con-
troversies involving rights of foreign incidence (so-called con-
flicting laws). This distinction is one of some difficulty but it
does not lie within the scope of the present discussion.
22
n Cf. Salmond, Jurisprudence (3d ed.), 85-sq., 372 sq.
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5. The last procedural stage in the order of preference is
punishment. The term punishment is a narrower term than
penalty. Penalty may or may not include punishment, but pun-
ishment can never include a purely compensatory or restorative
i enedy.
Further classification. Remedies may be classified as penal
and remedial, phylactic and non-phylactic, repetitive and non-
repetitive, and as those which provide integral enforcement or
protection of the endophylactic relation and those which furnish
substitutional redress. Adopting the last as a basis, remedies may
be arranged into the following table: 23







Resumn5. The remedy of restraint is always proleptic (an-
ticipatory). Restraint can only come before the act to be re-
strained. If the wrongful act has been accomplished, another
form of remedy is necessary.
Compulsion, also, is proleptic. Restraint is coercion against
the doing of an act, while compulsion is coercion requiring an
act to be done. Compulsory coercion is used because an act which
ought to be done is not done. If the act required is or has been
done, no remedy is needed. Restraint and compulsion, therefore,
are opposite forms of coercion; the one for prohibiting an act;
the other for compelling an act.
"The German classification of Actions is 1 . Anspruchsklagen- (a)
Anfechtungs: (b) Kundigungs; (c) Riickritts: (d) Aufrechnungs; (e)
Leistungsklagen; 2. Festellungsklagen: (a) affirmative; (b) negative: Kohler
"Zivilprocess und Konkursrecht" in Kohler-Holtzendorff (1913), Enzyklo.
pfidie, 111. 3o8 sq. Cf. Seuffert. "Kommentar zur Civilprozessordnung,"
(loth ed., Munich, 19o7), 1, sec. 253, p. 361.
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Restitution is a remedy for restoring a person, whose legal
rights have been infringed, to his original positioh.2 4  This rem-
edy is purely analeptic (curative). It can be employed only where
there has been a deprivation of the substance or corpus of a legal
right. Restitutive remedy restores the corpus of the right to the
innocent party by coercive measures.2 5  In all the foregoing rem-
edies, the distinguishing mark is a specific coercive sanction. Some
act is commanded or prohibited. The sanction is specific. That
particular act must be done or omitted. In the case of phylactic
restraint or of phylactic compulsion, the duty, to omit an act or
to do it, is sanctioned by direct measures against the person of
the defendant. In the case of restitution, there is a specific exec-
utive sanction, but no duty in the defendant to act or to refrain,
except the duty not to interfere with the execution -of the sanc-
tion. Restraint and compulsion require acts of the defendant.
The restitutive remedy rests entirely on public executive initia-
tive.
The declaratory remedy determines the existence or non-
existence of a legal relation.2 6  It does not involve any coercion
except the coercion implied in the legal relation. In that respect
it differs from the remedies of phylactic restraint, phylactic com-
pulsion, and restitution, all of which are directly coercive, requir-
"The restitutive remedy is not to be confused with the Roman "in in-
tegrum restitutio." The latter remedy was purely-declaratory in substance,
while the restitutive remedy is coercive. Cf. Savigny, "System des heutigen
Rdmischen Rechts, VII, Sees. 315 sq., p. 90 sq.
'There are instances which present some apparent, if not real, difficulty
of classification. If a plaintiff has been prevented unlawfully from taking
an office, he cannot be restored to that which he has not had. If he invokes
the remedy of mandamus, the order compels the defendant to give way to the
plaintiff and perhaps to do other acts. This remedy is clearly coercive com-
pulsion. It is not otherwise even though the plaintiff has been unlawfully
removed from office. The remedy is still not restitutive because it commands
acts of the defendant. Judged by its ultimate. purpose, however, in the latter
case, the remedy is restorative.
The remedy of quo warranto is more difficult of classification because of
the variety of ways in which it may be employed. The form of a judgment
alone will determine its proper place. It may take on the form of phylactic
restraint like the writ of prohibition, or it may be purely restitutive. When
the judgment is simply of ouster, it may conceivably be purely declaratory.
Cf. Mechem, "Public Officers" (i8go), secs. 496-7.
'For a discussion of declarations of fact, see Borchard, note 13, supra,
43 sq.
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ing acts to be done or omitted as parts of the execution of the
remedy.
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Declaratory redress may be invoked in two cases: (i) after
breach of an ectophylactic duty and prior to breach of an endo-
phylactic duty; and (2). after breach of an endophylactic duty.
In the first case, the declaratory remedy is proleptic or preventive
(with reference to the endophylactic relation). In the second
case, the remedy is analeptic or curative. Proleptic declarations
may affirm the existence of legal relations; these are repetitive
declarations. They may negate the existence of an asserted
legal relation; these are exclusory declarations. Analeptic (cur-
ative) declarations may either constitute a legal relation or abro-
gate a legal relation.






All the forms of remedy considered up to this point in the
summary afford integral redress. The plaintiff is afforded pro-
tection of the identical legal relation which is asserted. Pro-
tection of this asserted legal relation is effected by restraint, com-
pulsion, or declaration. Where, however, the complainant does
not seek specific protection of an asserted legal relation, but
requires a substitutional form of redress, then the sanction is
general and takes the form of compensation or punishment.
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" As has already been observed, the term "declaratory" is ambiguous. It
may mean the following: (I) any judicial finding, order, or entry, whether
directly coercive or not; (2) a judicial finding not directly in itself involving
coercion; and (3) a judicial finding of a prophylactic nature. For reasons,
already stated, the present writer uses the term in the second sense. In
the first sense, all orders, findings, and entries of court (e. g., money judg-
ments, administrative orders. etc.) are declaratory. In the third sense, the
term is limited to the so-called declaratory judgment.
- It may be observed that even though the relation adduced is infrangi-
ble, unless the defendant can obtain the enforcement of a specific legal rela-
tion, the remedy must be compensatory. Thus, in the action of debt, which
on historical grounds must be classified as a species of real action and which
clothes an infrangible relation, the 'judgment in form is for money and
satisfaction is made by payment of any money which equals the amount of the
judgment. From the standpoint of redress a specialty debt does not differ
from a simple promise.
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Redress, especially in equity, is often complex. A decree
may be declaratory in part; it may re.train an act in another part;
it may compel an act by another part; and it may award com-
pensation by another part. Finally, it may be noticed that re-
dress may be afforded either by mesne or final process. Thus,
where a writ of replevin issues upon complaint, affidavit, and
bond, the chattel is restored to the plaintiff, and the final judg-
ment is either declaratory of plaintiff's restored possession or
for restitution to the defendant. Remedies, therefore, may be
classified from the standpoint of the ultimate result of the entire
proceeding or with reference to a particular step in a judicial
proceeding. Thus. in the case of replevin, the remedy is resti-
tutive from the standpoint of the whole proceeding, or declara-
tory from the standpoint of the final judgment if the plaintiff
prevails, and compulsory if the defendant prevails.
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